What determines reciprocity in employment relations? We conducted a controlled eld experiment and tested the extent to which cash and non-monetary gifts aect workers' productivity. Our main nding is that the nature of the gift, not its monetary value, determines the prevalence of reciprocal reactions. A gift in-kind results in a signicant and substantial increase in workers' productivity. An equivalent cash gift, on the other hand, is largely ineective even though an additional experiment showed that workers would strongly favor the gift's cash equivalent.
Introduction
How can rms motivate their employees to provide eort above the minimal level? This question is of great importance for both theorists and practitioners. Assuming that workers strictly pursue what is in their material self-interest, a large theoretical literature explores how explicit and implicit contracts can be designed so that the workers' interests are aligned with the rm's objectives (see MacLeod (2007) , Prendergast (1999) or Gibbons (1998) ). A dierent strand of literature, based on sociological and psychological insights, questions the assumption of purely self-interested humans, underlining the importance of reciprocity in the presence of contractual incompleteness (see Fehr and Gächter (2000) for an overview).
1 According to this view, paying above market-clearing wages (i.e. sharing part of the prots) can be protable for rms if workers reciprocate positively to kind treatment and return the favor by exerting higher eort (see Akerlof (1982) ).
The determinants of reciprocity in naturally occurring employment relations are largely unexplored, despite a wide range of potential economic implica-1 By reciprocity we refer to the behavioral phenomenon where people respond likewise towards kind or unkind treatment, even in the absence of reputational concerns. For theoretical models of reciprocity, see Rabin (1993) , Charness and Rabin (2002) , Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) , Falk and Fischbacher (2006) , or Cox et al. (2007). tions such as downward wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment (see Bewley (1999) ).
A substantial number of laboratory experiments provides empirical support for a positive relationship between xed wages and eort, suggesting that reciprocal behavior can lead to large eciency gains (e.g. see Fehr et al. (1993 see Fehr et al. ( , 1997 , Hannan et al. (2002) , Brown et al. (2004) or Charness (2004)). However, the emerging experimental evidence from naturally occurring labor markets provides at best moderate or weak support for positive reciprocity. Output elasticities with respect to wages vary between only 0.07 and 0.38.
2 Until now, higher wages have thus led to relatively low and largely insignicant productivity gains in labor market eld experiments. 3 A potential explanation for this discrepancy between the eld and the lab is that the attribution of volition (i.e. the perceived kindness associated with the pay raise) is more dicult in the eld than in the lab, where the entire action space and potential payos are salient information (see Falk (2007) p. 1510).
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A low or absent correlation between wages and productivity could thus be the result of weak kindness signals, not necessarily implying that reciprocity does not matter in the labor market.
We hypothesize that, unlike a wage increase, non-monetary gifts or gifts 2 See Gneezy and List (2006) , Kube et al. (2007) , Cohn et al. (2007) , Bellemare and Shearer (2007) , Al-Ubaydli et al. (2006), and Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2005) or Fehr et al. (2007) for an overview. See also Maréchal and Thöni (2007) and List (2006) for giftexchange experiments in competitive markets.
3 In contrast Kube et al. (2007) nd a large negative impact of wage cuts on productivity. 4 For example, if an agent knows that the principal can choose a wage from an interval between 1 and 100, it is clear that paying a wage of 100 to the agent is kind. One might therefore expect agents to be less reciprocal if they receive 100 without knowing that this is the highest possible wage. See Charness et al. (2004) or Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2005) for evidence that payo information crucially aects the prevalence of reciprocal behavior.
in-kind provide a more salient signal of kind intentions and therefore represent a superior mechanism for the establishment of successful gift-exchange relations. In order to test this, we conducted a controlled experiment in a naturally occurring work environment. We hired job applicants to catalog the books from a library for a limited time duration (i.e. excluding any possibility of reemployment) at an announced hourly wage of e12 -the amount actually paid out in our benchmark treatment. 5 In a second treatment, we implemented an unexpected wage increase of nearly 20%. As an alternative, we gave subjects a gift in-kind (thermos bottle) of equivalent monetary value instead of additional money in the third treatment. Subsequently, we ran an additional control treatment, where workers were told the actual price of the gift in-kind, eliminating any uncertainty with regard to its monetary value.
The results show that the nature of gifts crucially determines the prevalence and strength of reciprocal behavior. An increase in xed wages only has a negligible impact on workers' productivity. However, a gift in-kind of equivalent monetary value has an economically and statistically signicant eect on productivity. Workers provide 30 percent more output on average. Moreover, this eect remains large and signicant over the course of the entire working period. In contrast to all existing labor market eld experiments, the elasticity of output towards the change in xed compensation is remarkably high with 1.54, emphasizing that productivity gains exceed the relative increase in labor costs. Our main result remains largely unchanged if the price of the gift is communicated to the workers. Treatment dierences are thus not due to a systematic overestimation of the monetary value of the gift.
To track down the cause for the sharp behavioral contrast, we complement our eld experiment with an experimental questionnaire study. We use short scenarios describing our treatment manipulations from the eld experiment to elicit how the gift is perceived. We nd that the gift in-kind is signicantly more likely to signal kind intentions than the wage increase. In contrast to the gift in-kind, subjects consider the increase in hourly wage a payment for their performance rather than a present. An additional choice experiment shows, however, that these dierences are not due to a general preference in favor of the gift in-kind. When given the choice between actually receiving the gift in-kind and its cash equivalent, the overwhelming majority of subjects opts for the money. Taken together, these additional results corroborate the eld data and suggest that the symbolic aspect of the gift rather than its monetary value determines the successful establishment of gift-exchange relations.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the existing evidence for reciprocity and social preferences in general is almost exclusively based on lab experiments. Generalizing experimental evidence from the laboratory to behavior in the eld might be dicult, however; critics argue that several factors such as demand eects and the highly stylized context might inuence behavior (see Levitt and List (2007) ). Subjects in our experiment do not know that they are part of an experiment and perform a typical student helpers' job. We are therefore able to observe them in a naturally occurring -but controlled -work environment.
Second, our results provide a novel behavioral rationale as to why a large and growing part of overall compensation takes the form of non-monetary benets or perks (see Marino and Zabojnik (forthcoming a) Rajan and Wulf (2006) ). Several theoretical arguments have been put forth in the literature to explain the use of perks. One of the most prominent explanation is based on the idea that rms can provide perks at lower costs due to economies of scale or exemptions from taxation (e.g. Lazear and Oyer (2007) ). Other theories relate to agency problems (Marino and Zabojnik (forthcoming b)) or the reduction of worker's eort costs (Oyer (forthcoming) ). In addition, our results suggest that a higher share of perks in the compensation mix can be protable for the rm because workers are more likely to reciprocate positively to the receipt of perks.
Finally, the widespread phenomenon of non-monetary gift-giving is puzzling from a standard economic point of view. We expect money to be superior to gifts in-kind, as gifts in kind do not necessarily match the recipient's preferences (e.g. see Waldfogel (1993) ). The results from our choice experiment support the latter argument and show that more than 90 percent of the subjects prefer receiving money to a gift in-kind. Despite this strong preference for cash, our gift in-kind had a surprisingly greater eect on workers' productivity than the cash gift. This suggests that the monetary value of the gift is of lesser importance than its signaling character. Our results are thus encouraging for recent theoretical advances analyzing the role of non-monetary gifts as costly signals (see Camerer (1988) , Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) and Prendergast and Stole (2001) ).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we describe the experimental design. Subsequently, we present and discuss the experimental results in Sections 3 and 4.
Experimental Design
In May 2007, the library of an economic chair at a German University had to be cataloged. We used this as an opportunity to run a eld experiment and recruited students from all over the campus with posters. The announcement read that it was a one-time job opportunity for half a day (three hours), and that pay would amount to e12 per hour. The announced wage of e12 served as a reference point. About 300 students applied during the two month announcement phase. A research assistant randomly selected 51 persons out of the list of applicants. They were invited via email and asked to conrm the starting date, reminding them that the job would pay e12 per hour.
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Upon arriving, the subjects were seated in front of a computer terminal with a table of randomly selected books beside them. Their task was to enter the books' author(s), title, publisher, year, and ISBN number into an electronic data base. Participants were allowed to take a break whenever necessary. A research assistant explained the task to them, strictly following a xed protocol. Before subjects actually started to work, they were told their hourly wage and informed on any additional payments or benets.
In a rst wave, we conducted three dierent treatments. In our benchmark treatment (Base), we paid e12 per hour. In treatment Money, subjects' total wage was increased unexpectedly by roughly 20% by paying them an additional e7 for the day. In treatment Bottle, instead of the e7 wage increase, subjects received a small thermos bottle worth e7, which was wrapped in a transparent gift paper and which should therefore have clearly signaled that the employer wanted to be kind towards the worker. 7 We had 17 subjects in the benchmark treatment, 16 in Money, and 15 in Bottle; three subjects failed to show up to work.
In a second wave, we invited 15 additional subjects to participate in a fourth treatment (treatment PriceTag). This treatment was analogous to
Bottle, except that we explicitly mentioned the actual price of the thermos bottle and marked it with a corresponding price tag. By comparing treatment
PriceTag and Bottle, we asses the robustness of our results with regard to the uncertainty of the actual price of the gift.
The rst wave of the experiment took place over a 9 day period, with up to 6 subjects per day. The second wave took place on the subsequent three days. The subjects showed up successively at dierent times (three in the morning and three in the afternoon). They were separated from each other in dierent rooms at an online computer terminal, without being monitored.
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The computer application for entering the details of the books recorded the exact time of each log, allowing us to reconstruct exactly the number of characters each person entered over time. After 3 hours elapsed, subjects completed a short questionnaire and were paid their total wage. In order 7 The dierent gifts where communicated as follows: We have a further small gift to thank you: You receive e7 (respectively: this thermos bottle) in addition. See Figure 4 for a depiction of the gift. 8 All this was done in order to minimize the possible bias due to peer eects or monitoring. Furthermore, all subjects interacted with the same female research assistant to eliminate experimenter eects. In order to avoid an experimenter demand eect, the research assistant neither knew the purpose of the study nor the reason for the wage increase or the gift in-kind.
to observe them in a natural work environment, subjects were not told that they were participating in an experiment.
We complemented our eld experiment with a survey experiment in order to test how our treatment manipulations were perceived. For this purpose, we invited 2475 students via email to participate in an online survey in November 2007. None of these students had taken part in the previous eld experiment, and each student was only allowed to participate once. Participation was incentivized by raing o seven e40 vouchers to be spent at an international online-shop. Upon logging into the electronic survey, the 1036 respondents were randomly assigned to one of three scenarios. Each began with a short description of one of our treatments described above (Money, Bottle, or PriceTag). Afterwards, subjects had to put themselves in the position of the employee in the described situation, and were then asked to rate dierent statements about the situation, the employers' action, and the gift, using 5-point Likert scales. Finally, we elicit preferences for receiving cash or the gift in-kind in an incentive compatible way by conducting a laboratory experiment in December 2007 and January 2008 with 172 subjects. All subjects had just completed and earned money in an unrelated experiment. We then told them that they would receive an additional payment of e7 in excess of their current payo, and that they could choose between receiving the amount in cash or receiving a thermos bottle worth e7. We used exactly the same thermos bottle in all 9 We included the following negatively and positively loaded items: I feel treated kindly/unkindly in the described situation, I perceive the behavior of the other person in the described situation as kind/unkind, I perceive the thermos bottle/the additional e7 as a gift, I perceive the thermos bottle/the additional e7 as a payment for my performance. of our studies, or a photograph of it in the survey study (see Figure 4) .
Results

Cash, Perks and Performance
The number of characters entered precisely measures workers' productivity and is considered as outcome variable for the subsequent analysis. Result 2: In contrast to the wage increase, a gift in-kind of equivalent monetary value results in a highly signicant and large productivity gain. The resulting productivity gain is larger than the relative increase in labor costs. Result 3: Workers produce almost an equal amount of output in treatments PriceTag and Bottle. In comparison with the baseline treatment, PriceTag results in a substantial increase in productivity. The uncertainty concerning the exact monetary value of the gift in-kind thus fails to account for our treatment eects.
The regression models in Table 2 corroborate the results described above.
In column 1, the total number of characters entered is regressed on the treatment dummies using OLS. In comparison with the benchmark treatment, the number of characters entered is more than 2000 characters higher in PriceTag Tables 3 and  4 . Because 14 students stated that they had never been employed before, we loose those observations when controlling for previously earned hourly wages in column (4). Values in the last three rows of this table represent p-values from a Wald test for the null-hypotheses of equal coecients. Signicance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
suggesting that treatment eects are stable over the observed time period.
We assess the robustness of our results with regard to the inclusion of an extensive set of control variables.
12 Age, gender, and major are included in the set of socioeconomic controls. We further include several variables capturing how workers perceived the task (e.g. interesting, strenuous etc.).
Finally, we control for the hourly wage earned at the last job. The regressions in columns (3) to (5) of Table 2 highlight that our main results remain basically unchanged for all alternative model specications.
In contrast to the quantity of output, quality is more dicult to observe for the employer. An important question is therefore, whether the observed productivity gain primarily stems from workers producing more low quality output. In order to test for quality dierences, we measure the quality of output by the ratio of faultless logs to the total number of books entered. 13 With a quality ratio of 0.872, quality is lowest in the benchmark treatment. Treatment Money, Bottle, and PriceTag realized marginally higher quality ratios (i.e. 0.908, 0.894, and 0.910). Pairwise comparisons using Wilcoxon ranksum tests indicate that qualities do not dier signicantly in any treatments.
Hence, if anything our results suggest that the opposite is true: Compared to the benchmark treatment, workers tend to produce output that is of slightly higher quality in all gift-exchange treatments.
12 Table 3 and 4 contain summary statistics and denitions for all included control variables.
13 See Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2005) and Kube et al. (2007) for a similar approach. Two research assistants searched for spelling mistakes in the titles of the books by running an automatic spell check program.
Manipulation Check
The results from the survey experiment corroborate the observed behavioral patterns. Compared with treatment Money, subjects who were exposed to either the Bottle or PriceTag vignettes are signicantly more likely to perceive the employer's course of action as kind. The results are basically the same if subjects are asked whether they feel treated kindly in the described situation. In contrast to the wage increase, the thermos bottle is signicantly more likely to be perceived as a gift and less as a payment for one's performance. Consistent with the behavior in our eld experiment, there are no signicant dierences in perception between the treatments Bottle and PriceTag.
14 We constructed a kindness index using all six items from the questionnaire by computing an unweighted mean of all answers. A Cronbach's alpha of 0.832 shows that the internal reliability is quite high and suggests that our kindness index is unidimensional. 15 The cumulative distribution functions of the kindness index depicted in Panel (a) in Figure 2 show that our gift in-kind is more likely to achieve a higher score for the kindness index than the e7 wage increase. The null-hypothesis that a cash gift and the gift inkind are considered to be equally kind must be rejected on any conventional signicance level (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p<0.001 for both non-monetary 14 See Table 5 for the corresponding signicance levels. 15 The Cronbach alpha is a measure of internal consistency or reliability of a scale, where 1 is the highest possible value (see Cronbach (1951) ). We recoded the negatively loaded variables in such a way that a higher number indicates less agreement with the statement. We dropped 11 observations from the sample because they did not answer all six questions. This does not change any of the results qualitatively. Result 4: The gift in-kind is a stronger signal of kind intentions than is an equivalent wage increase. An increase in hourly wages is more likely to be perceived as a payment for one's performance rather than an actual gift.
Preferences for Money and Perks
Are our results driven by a general preference for the thermos bottle? In order to shed light on this question, we conducted an additional incentive compatible lab experiment.
We gave subjects in our lab experiment the actual choice between receiving an additional e7 or the thermos bottle used in the eld experiment. We informed the subjects that the thermos bottle is worth e7. 159 out of 172 subjects (92.4%) opted to receive an extra payment of e7 in addition to their previously earned income in cash rather than the thermos of equivalent value (see Panel (b) of Figure 2 ). We can reject the hypothesis that subjects are drawn from a population in which preferences for cash gifts and in-kind gifts are equiprobable (binomial test, two-sided, p<0.0001). We thus conclude:
Result 5: When subjects are free to choose between receiving e7 in cash or an object of equivalent value, more than 92 percent choose cash rather than the object. The gift in-kind is thus very unlikely to match its recipient's preferences.
Discussion and Conclusion
In the present paper, we studied the determinants of reciprocity in employment relations using a controlled eld experiment. We document a sharp contrast in responses of productivity towards cash and non-monetary gifts.
An unexpected increase in xed wages only had a negligible impact on the output workers generated. However, a gift in-kind of equivalent monetary value had an economically and statistically signicant eect on productivity.
The additional 20 percent increase in expenditures was rewarded by a sizably larger productivity gain of 30 percent.
Furthermore, we showed that eliminating subjects' uncertainty concern-ing the true monetary value of the gift did not alter the results. Interestingly, as we illustrated in a follow-up experiment, cash and gifts had very dierent impacts, despite an overwhelming preference for the gift's cash equivalent.
Our survey study illustrates that our gift in-kind is a stronger signal for kind intentions than is the wage increase. A wage increase is more likely to be considered a payment for one's performance rather than a gift. Together, these results suggest that the signal conveyed through the gift -and not its monetary value -determines the prevalence of reciprocal behavior.
These results have important methodological and practical implications.
First, they point to a general problem when trying to transfer laboratory setups to the eld, namely the decline of control over treatment manipulations.
Applied to our design at hand, they imply that perceived kindness is probably more easily manipulated in the lab, especially when the range of possible actions and payos are clearly dened and common knowledge due to amplied salience. However, in the eld [...] the signal and perception of gifts is more ambiguous, which renders the establishment of a gift-exchange relationship dicult (Falk (2007 (Falk ( ) p. 1510 . Manipulation checks could therefore be a useful tool to understand disparities between eld and lab evidence.
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Second, our ndings suggest that appropriate gifts in-kind are likely to provide the recipient with a clearer and more salient signal of kind intentions than money. In fact, social scientists have found that money is, depending on the situation, deemed unacceptable as a gift (e.g. Webley et al. (1983) Webley and Wilson (1989) and Burgoyne and Routh (1991) ). While our results show that a non-monetary gift is more likely to increase workers' productivity, it would be premature, however, to conclude that higher wages are generally not able to trigger reciprocity. Given that higher wages are communicated in a relatively neutral manner in our experiment -as well as in Gneezy and List (2006) and Kube et al. (2007) -future studies examining whether there is potential scope for increasing perceived kindness by choosing a more aective framing might be worthwhile. 17 Such framing could render the gift-character of the wage increase salient.
Interestingly, the superiority of the non-monetary gift comes at a surprise from a standard economic point of view, as we nd that the gift in-kind is very unlikely to match the recipient's preferences (see also Waldfogel (1993) ).
While we provide evidence suggesting that part of the superiority originates from signaled intentions, an additional factor might be that non-monetary gifts enable a kind of emotional attachment on part of the receiver that is much harder to establish with money. In this context, non-monetary incentives and symbolic awards (e.g. employee of the month) can be a promising and cheap motivational instrument (see also Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) , or Frey and Neckermann (forthcoming) ). Non-monetary incentives and awards are further interesting since they are probably less likely than monetary incentives to crowd out workers' intrinsic motivation (see Heyman and Ariely (2004) , Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) or Frey et al. (1996) ). To explore whether such non-monetary incentives and gifts share the same nature promises to be a fruitful area for future research.
17 See the discussion of framing eects and fairness in Kahneman et al. (1986) . 
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